Review of the IMF's lending framework by C. Janssens & E. Vincent
review of the imf’s lending frAmework
45
Review of the IMF’s lending framework
c. janssens
E. vincent *
*  The authors would like to thank L. Coene and W. Kiekens for their valuable 
comments.
Introduction
Since the IMF’s inception, there have been several major 
changes in the world economy of relevance for its lending 
operations. Advanced countries stopped borrowing from 
the Fund in the 1980s when more fragile middle-income 
emerging  markets  became  the  biggest  IMF  borrowers. 
More importantly, globalisation and financial deepening 
broadened the range of channels through which real and 
financial  shocks  could  affect  individual  economies  and 
spill over to other countries. Cross-border flows and rising 
financial linkages changed the profile of risks that mem-
bers face, inter alia, by deepening vulnerabilities, amplify-
ing the effects of various shocks, and transmitting them 
more  quickly  across  national  borders.  Meanwhile,  the 
ability to influence private creditors diminished as bonds 
largely replaced loans, implying that private creditors were 
less subject to regulatory suasion. As a result, IMF mem-
bers’ needs to borrow from the Fund have changed, as 
reflected in a change in the size and duration of financing 
arrangements.
The growing magnitude of private financing flows and 
the emergence of capital account crises made the signal-
ling effect of the Fund’s financing increasingly important. 
Short-term  balance  of  payments  pressures  experienced 
by  some  members  were  perceived  to  be  the  result  of 
«speculative» capital flows, resulting from rapid shifts in 
market perceptions or from misunderstandings of policies 
by markets. At the same time, the massive capital move-
ments that triggered capital account crises dwarfed the 
amounts that the Fund could deploy. These factors gave 
prominence to the Fund’s signalling role and the catalytic 
effect of IMF financing.
Similar developments have also been observed during the 
financial crisis that began in 2007. The scale of the prob-
lems in some countries affected by the crisis led the Fund 
to  grant  exceptional  amounts  of  financial  assistance  at 
short notice. Also, the magnitude of the financing require-
ments prompted the Fund to call upon other sources of 
financial support in addition to its own assistance.
From  time  to  time,  the  Fund  has  adapted  its  financial 
toolkit in response to a changing world and the evolv-
ing needs of its membership by redesigning, creating or 
terminating individual facilities and adapting its financing 
policies. To illustrate this, for instance, the Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF) has gone through several cycles of 
liberalisation and tightening with developments in world 
commodity markets and as the Fund has tried to strike 
the  right  balance  between  financing  and  conditional-
ity.  Other  examples  of  how  the  Fund  has  adapted  its 
array of financial facilities to new circumstances are the 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and the Contingent 
Credit  Line  (CCL).  The  SRF  was  adopted  at  the  height 
of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 to lend to countries 
with  large  short-term  financing  needs  stemming  from 
a  sudden  collapse  of  market  confidence.  Shortly  after 
the establishment of the SRF, the Fund set up the CCL 
as a precautionary line of defence against the spread of 
capital-account-driven crises. Due to a lack of demand by 
potential users, the CCL was nevertheless wound up at 
the end of 2003. 
More  recently,  in  light  of  worsening  global  economic 
conditions, the IMF has introduced some modifications to 
one of its concessional lending facilities, the Exogenous 
Shocks Facility (ESF) to better meet the needs of its low-
income  members.    Furthermore,  it  set  up  a  new  non-
concessional Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF), which is 
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(1)  For the sake of simplicity, the paper refers collectively to the various policies on 
the use of Fund resources as “facilities”, while this term normally only refers to 
those policies on the use of Fund resources that fall outside the credit tranches.
(2)  A member’s quota is the capital subscription, expressed in SDRs, that a country 
must pay to the IMF on joining. Up to 25 p.c. is payable in SDRs or other 
acceptable reserve assets and the remainder in the member’s own currency. 
Quotas, which reflect members’ relative size in the world economy, are normally 
reviewed and adjusted, if necessary, every five years.
designed to help members facing exceptional balance of 
payments difficulties arising from external market devel-
opments  despite  strong  underlying  fundamentals  and 
domestic policies.
Consequently,  after  over  50  years  of  evolution,  the 
Fund now has at its disposal a large arsenal of financial 
facilities  (1), which are the result of its efforts to keep its 
relevance  in  a  changing  world.  Nevertheless,  lending 
instruments  and  policies  have  often  been  created  and 
adapted on an ad hoc basis with specific balance of pay-
ments difficulties in mind. As a result, eligibility criteria, 
access policies and the charges and maturities schedules 
of the Fund’s lending instruments are often not mutu-
ally aligned, leading to a complex web of facilities and 
policies.
The  IMF  is  therefore  currently  reviewing  its  lending 
instruments  and  access  policies  as  one  of  the  priority 
efforts underway to refocus and modernise its work in 
the context of its ongoing overall strategic review. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide an input into this 
discussion. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  I  gives  an 
overview of the Fund’s current lending facilities and the 
policies governing them. Section II details the issues con-
cerning the Fund’s lending framework. More specifically, 
this section illustrates how some of the Fund’s lending 
facilities may have lost their relevance, that gaps could be 
perceived in the current lending framework and why the 
framework itself seems fragmented and overly complex. 
These issues can affect the credibility of the Fund’s lend-
ing framework and hence the perceived legitimacy of the 
institution. Note that the discussion on the appropriate-
ness  of  quotas  (2)  as  a  metric  on  which  to  base  access 
to Fund resources falls outside the scope of this paper. 
Finally, in section III, some options are proposed to address 
the issues raised in section II. Three possibilities are put 
forward : (i) a multi-facility framework, with one facility 
for each type of balance of payments need, (ii) a single 
flexible facility and (iii) a dual framework, consisting of 
two facilities.
1.    The Fund’s current lending 
framework : overview
The Fund’s lending framework currently consists of two 
concessional and seven nonconcessional lending instru-
ments. This paper will only consider the Fund’s facilities in 
the General Resources Account (GRA), i.e. the IMF’s non-
concessional facilities, which are subsequently discussed 
in this section.
From  its  early  history,  IMF  credit  has  been  made  avail-
able in tranches. A purchase in the first credit tranche 
involves the use of IMF credit of not more than 25 p.c. of 
quota. The upper credit tranches refer to any use of IMF 
credit beyond the first credit tranche. Resources drawn 
in the credit tranches can be used to meet any balance 
of payments need. The IMF has a more liberal attitude to 
making resources available in the first credit tranche than 
in the upper credit tranches, provided that the member 
is making reasonable efforts to solve its balance of pay-
ments problems. Access to the upper credit tranches is 
normally provided under a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), 
which  is  designed  to  help  countries  address  short-  to 
medium-term  actual  or  potential  balance  of  payments 
needs. SBAs have existed since 1952 and have provided 
the bulk of IMF funding.
In 1963, the Fund established the Compensatory Financing 
Facility in response to fluctuations in the prices of primary 
commodities that afflicted many countries in almost every 
region around the globe. The main purpose of compensa-
tory financing is to ensure timely financing for members 
that  are  experiencing  balance  of  payments  difficulties 
resulting from either a sudden shortfall in export earnings 
or an increase in the cost of imported cereals. 
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was established in 1974 
as  a  vehicle  aimed  at  overcoming  actual  or  potential 
balance  of  payments  difficulties  resulting  from  macro-
economic  and  structural  problems.  The  creation  of  the 
EFF  reflected  an  increasing  recognition  that  balance  of 
payments problems could have structural origins and thus 
could require both an extended period of adjustment and 
policy changes that would strengthen the productive and 
export base of the economy. 
In 1982, the Fund developed the policy on emergency 
assistance for natural disasters, and just over a decade 
later adopted similar procedures for post-conflict cases. 
The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) was established in 
late 1997. The purpose of the SRF is to provide assistance 
to members that are experiencing exceptional balance of 
payments difficulties due to a large, short-term financ-
ing need resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of 
market confidence, reflected in pressure on the capital 
account  and  the  member’s  reserves.  SRF  resources  are 
provided  under  Stand-By  or  Extended  Arrangements  in 
addition to credit tranche or EFF resources.review of the imf’s lending frAmework
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(1)  Accordingly, the effective limits on credit tranche and EFF access are lower if a 
member uses Fund resources under another facility, such as emergency assistance 
or the CFF.
(2)  These four criteria include: (i) balance of payments pressure on the capital 
account resulting in a need for IMF financing that cannot be met within the 
normal access limits; (ii) a high probability that debt will remain sustainable 
established on the basis of a rigorous and systematic analysis; (iii) good prospects 
for the member to regain access to private capital markets while Fund resources 
are still outstanding and (iv) a strong adjustment programme adopted by the 
member that provides a reasonable strong prospect of success, including not only 
the member’s adjustment plans but also its institutional and political capacity to 
deliver that adjustment”.
(3)  SRF support can only be provided “to a member that is experiencing exceptional 
balance of payments difficulties due to a large short-term financing need 
resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in 
pressure on the capital account and the member’s reserves”.
The SRF is not subject to explicit access limits, in contrast 
to the SBA and the EFF. In fact, access by a member to the 
Fund’s resources in the credit tranches and under Extended 
Arrangements is subject to a limit of 100 p.c. of quota on 
an annual basis and 300 p.c. cumulatively. There is also a 
separate “global” limit of 100 p.c. of quota annually and 
300 p.c. cumulatively which applies to overall access by 
members to the Fund’s general resources (i.e. to aggre-
gate access across all GRA facilities and policies)  (1). These 
access limits serve several purposes. They give members 
confidence  about  the  degree  of  financial  support  that 
the Fund is normally prepared to provide, and encourage 
an appropriate balance with each member’s adjustment 
policies, and other sources of financing. The annual limit 
helps to ensure that members do not exhaust their total 
potential access to the Fund more rapidly than would be 
warranted by the nature and size of shocks, while the 
cumulative limit reduces the risk of the Fund’s resources 
being exhausted, so that members are not treated on a 
first-come-first-served basis. The access limits also reduce 
the risk of members finding themselves unable to repay 
the  Fund,  thereby  safeguarding  IMF  resources.  Access 
limits have important financial implications for IMF pro-
gramme countries since they determine the amount of 
Fund credit that is subject to surcharges and set an impor-
tant threshold beyond which access decisions are subject 
to greater scrutiny.
Access  can  indeed  exceed  these  limits  in  “exceptional 
circumstances” (i.e. under “the exceptional circumstances 
clause”).  As  the  Fund  expected  that  the  vast  majority 
of cases where exceptional access could be considered 
would be in capital account crises, an exceptional access   
framework was designed in 2003 with these cases in mind. 
This framework defines four substantive criteria  (2), proce-
dures  for  early  consultation  with  the  Board,  additional 
information disclosure requirements to raise the burden of 
proof and ex-post evaluations of programmes that apply 
for exceptional access in capital account crises.
However,  on  the  occasion  of  the  2004  review  of  the 
exceptional access framework, it was decided that these 
criteria and procedures should be applied to all requests 
for exceptional access, i.e. for both capital and non-capital 
account cases. There nevertheless remains an important 
distinction differentiating the treatment of capital from 
non-capital  account  crises.  In  fact,  in  capital  account 
cases, the four substantive criteria must be met in order for 
exceptional access to be approved under the exceptional 
circumstances clause. Moreover, in cases of exceptional 
access in capital account crises, there is a strong presump-
tion that access will be provided using resources under 
the  SRF,  where  the  conditions  for  this  facility  apply  (3). 
This presumption was strengthened in 2003 and again in 
2004. Notwithstanding, it should be noted that the SRF 
Decision acknowledges that not all capital account crises 
can be resolved within the short SRF maturity.
In non-capital account cases on the other hand, requests 
for access above the limits need to be justified “in light of 
the four substantive criteria». In other words, observance 
of all criteria is not a requirement in these cases and the 
Board has the flexibility to grant high access under the 
exceptional circumstances clause.48
CHART 1  THE IMF'S EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS POLICY
(1)  (i) balance of payments pressure on the capital account resulting in a need for IMF financing that cannot be met within the limits ; (ii) a high probability that debt will remain 
sustainable established on the basis of a rigorous and systematic analysis ; (iii) good prospects for the member to regain access to private capital markets within the time Fund 
resources would be outstanding and (iv) a strong adjustment programme adopted by the member that provides a reasonable strong prospect of success, including not only the 
member's adjustment plans but also its institutional and political capacity to deliver that adjustment.
(2) The SRF Decision sets out a very specific circumstance test: SRF support would only be provided “to a member that is experiencing exceptional balance of payments difficulties 





Exceptional access criteria (1) 
under the exceptional access framework 
fulfilled ?
Request for exceptional access
is evaluated “in light of” the criteria






= Pending upon Executive Board approval.
Do conditions for the SRF apply ? (2)
Yes
No Yes
Capital account crisis ?review of the imf’s lending frAmework
49
(1)    When a member draws on the IMF’s general resources, it does so by purchasing 
SDRs or other members’ currencies in exchange for its own (domestic) currency. 
The IMF’s general resources are, by nature, revolving : purchases (or drawings) 
have to be reversed by repurchases (or repayments) in instalments within the 
period specified for a particular policy or facility.
(2)  Purchase and repurchase schedules and the frequency of instalments together 
determine the maturity of an IMF lending facility.






















1.  First credit tranche None None
2.25 – 4 years 3.25 – 5 years Quarterly      
2.  SBA 100 basis points for credit  
over 200 p.c. of quota ;  
200 basis points for credit  
over 300 p.c. of quota
25 basis points   
plus 10 basis  
points  
for amounts  
in excess of  
100 p.c.  
of quota
       
3.  EFF   4.5 – 7 years 4.5 – 10 years Semi-annual
         
4.  SRF 300-500 basis points initial  
surcharge rises by 50 basis  
points after 1 year and each  
subsequent 6 months  (3)
  2 – 2.5 years   2.5 – 3 years Semi-annual
           
5.  CFF None None 2.25 – 4 years 3.25 – 5 years Quarterly
           
6.  Emergency  
Assistance
None None None 3.25 – 5 years Quarterly
(1)  The table does not include the most recently created Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF), given the special nature of this facility, involving no Fund arrangement providing  
a framework for policy monitoring.
(2)  The basic rate of charge is the interest charge that is applied to outstanding IMF credit financed from the IMF’s general resources. It is set as a portion of the weekly SDR  
interest rate. Note that emergency loans are subject to the basic rate of charge, although interest subsidies are available, subject to availability, for countries eligible  
for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, one of the Fund’s concessional lending instruments.
(3)  SRF resources are provided under Stand-By or Extended Arrangements for access above the access limits applicable to credit tranche or EFF resources.
 
Basic  
 rate  (2)
50 basis  
points
The chart on the left gives a schematic overview of the 
Fund’s exceptional access policy.
When  a  member  seeks  an  IMF-supported  programme 
but does not face a pressing balance of payments need, 
it  may  treat  a  Fund  arrangement  as  precautionary,  i.e. 
a Stand-By or Extended Arrangement under which the 
member  has  indicated  its  intention  not  to  make  pur-
chases. Members may cease to treat an arrangement as 
precautionary at any time and make purchases under it as 
long as the conditions set by the arrangement have been 
met. Precautionary programmes can provide a valuable 
service in lending credibility to authorities’ policies, while 
sending a well-calibrated signal to markets.
The  table  below  specifies  the  modalities  of  the  Fund’s   
current nonconcessional facilities.
Table 1 details the charges that are applied to the different 
Fund facilities. Surcharges are added to the basic rate of 
charge to strengthen the incentives for members to avoid 
maintaining large Fund exposure and to encourage early 
repayment,  accordingly  preserving  the  revolving  nature 
of Fund financing. SRF surcharges are time-based – i.e. 
differentiated according to the period of use – while sur-
charges in the credit tranches and under the EFF are level-
based – i.e. differentiated according to the level of use.
The table also shows the repurchase modalities  (1) – includ-
ing  predetermined  repurchase  schedules  and  the  fre-
quency  of  repurchase  instalments  (2)  –  for  each  of  the 
different Fund facilities. The IMF’s repurchase policies are 
intended to ensure the revolving nature of its resources. 
The  Fund’s  repurchase  policy  is  guided  by  its  Articles 
of  Agreement,  which  define  fixed  repurchase  periods 
for IMF lending (Article V, Section 7(c)) and provide for 
early repurchases by members as their balance of pay-
ments and reserve position improves (Article V, Section 
7(b)). A major change to these repurchase policies was 
introduced in 1997 with the establishment of the SRF. In 
line with the short-term nature of this type of balance of 
payments need, the SRF, as the table above shows, incor-
porates  much  shorter  repurchase  periods  and  features 
predetermined schedules of repurchase expectations that 
are  legally  outside  the  framework  of  Article  V,  Section 
7(b). As for purchases in the credit tranches and under 
the  EFF  and  the  CFF,  repurchase  expectation  schedules 
were introduced in 2000, in the context of the review of 
IMF facilities. Hence, for most purchases, a borrower is 
expected to repurchase according to the relevant schedule 
of repurchase expectations which is earlier than under the 
schedule of repurchase obligations.
Time-based repurchase expectations can be extended upon 
request by the member, in which case repurchases fall due 
according to the original obligation schedule. Waivers are 
considered by the Board if a member’s external position 50
(1)  Provided by Executive Directors Bakker and Warjiyo on May 22, 2008.
(2)  Provided by Executive Director Nogueira Batista and Senior Advisor to Executive 
Director Mori on September 8, 2008.
is not strong enough for it to repay early without undue 
hardship or risk. Adjustment programmes supported by 
credit tranche or EFF resources are generally designed on 
the basis of the obligation schedule for repurchases, so 
that in most cases members will be in a position to meet 
repurchase expectations only if their external position is 
stronger than projected at the outset of the programme. 
In  contrast,  adjustment  programmes  supported  by  SRF 
resources  are  designed  on  the  basis  of  the  repurchase 
expectations schedule. Whereas under an SBA or EFF the 
Executive Board can allow a country to repay at the obli-
gation date, without policy-related conditions, a similar 
decision under the SRF requires the Board to be satisfied 
with the country’s policy stance. Nevertheless, the “policy 
test” for extensions of SRF repurchase expectations has 
been interpreted with flexibility.
In order to better align the modalities of the SRF to the 
diversity in duration of balance of payments needs expe-
rienced in capital account crises, the maturity structure 
of  the  facility  was  lengthened  in  2003,  i.e.  when  the 
exceptional access framework was set up. It was decided 
to  extend  the  maturity  of  SRF  repurchase  expectations 
by  one  year  and  that  of  repurchase  obligations  by  six 
months. Nevertheless, these are still shorter than under 
the SBA or EFF.
Finally, the Fund is also discussing the design of a possible 
new  liquidity  instrument,  tentatively  named  the  Rapid 
Access Line (RAL). In fact, many emerging markets see 
an unmet need for insurance against large and volatile 
capital flows. Fund members, however, have mixed views 
about  some  elements  of  the  design  of  such  a  facility, 
making it difficult to reach a consensus for an instrument 
that would be useful and actually used in practice. In this 
context,  alternative  design  proposals  for  the  RAL  have 
been put forward under the form of a Financial Stability 
Line (FSL)  (1) or Rapid Liquidity Line (RLL)  (2). The FSL would 
aim  to  guarantee  availability  of  finance  for  countries 
which are in the process of integrating into the interna-
tional financial markets should there be a sharp reversal in 
capital flows. The RLL would be geared towards countries 
already  integrated  into  international  financial  markets 
that follow basically sound economic policies to address 
the problem of capital outflows as a result of turbulence 
in global capital markets. 
In this context and in light of the ongoing financial tur-
moil,  the  IMF  decided,  in  October  2008,  to  create  the 
Short-Term  Liquidity  Facility  (SLF),  to  complement  the 
Fund’s  traditional  facilities  described  in  table  1  above. 
This  new  facility  is  designed  to  help  members  facing 
short-term, self-correcting balance of payments pressures, 
providing liquidity support to members with a very strong 
policy track record and a sound policy framework. Access 
under  the  facility  is  up  to  500 p.c.  of  quota,  available 
in the form of outright purchases, and limited to three 
outright purchases per 12-month period. The exceptional 
access  framework  nevertheless  does  not  apply  for  pur-
chases under the SLF as the members concerned are sub-
ject only to the substantive and procedural requirements 
specified in the SLF Decision. The SLF furthermore involves 
no  formal  ex-post  conditionality,  hence  the  nature  of 
the balance of payments problem and the related pre-
qualification framework constitute the key safeguard for 
the  Fund.  All  this  makes  the  SLF  a  somewhat  “special 
facility” within the IMF’s lending toolkit. Use of the facility 
is subject to the same charges and surcharges as in the 
credit tranches. 
To conclude this section, the chart below charts the evo-
lution, over the last 60 years, of IMF credit outstanding 
through its various nonconcessional lending instruments.
As the chart shows, the volume of loans provided by the 
IMF in the GRA has fluctuated significantly over time. For 
the first few years after the IMF was established in 1947, 
there was very limited use of IMF credit because most 
developing countries had emerged from the World War 
II  commodity  boom  with  substantial  foreign  exchange 
reserves,  and  European  countries  that  had  access  to 
Marshall Plan funds were discouraged from drawing on 
IMF resources. Aggregate use of Fund resources picked 
up during the 1960s, as countries experienced balance of 
payments difficulties and the Bretton Woods system came 
increasingly under strain. The collapse of Bretton Woods 
itself – together with the move to floating exchange rates 
by the industrialised countries – reduced the demand for 
IMF  resources.  However,  the  number  of  arrangements 
and  volume  of  IMF  credit  outstanding  soon  picked  up 
again in the aftermath of the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. 
The number of arrangements in place peaked during the 
debt crisis in the first half of the 1980s, but had almost 
halved  by  1989  as  these  countries  emerged  from  the 
debt crisis, and private capital flows resumed in the early 
1990s. Demand for IMF credit increased again in the first 
half of the 1990s, when the Fund became involved in 
helping  members’  transition  from  centrally  planned  to 
market economies, followed by a series of exceptionally 
large programmes to deal with capital account crises – 
beginning with Mexico in 1995 and including the Asian 
crisis countries, as well as Argentina, Brazil and Turkey. 
Aggregate use of IMF resources peaked in 1998 and 2003 
before plummeting in 2005 owing to early repurchases. review of the imf’s lending frAmework
51
(1)  The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to 
supplement the existing official reserves of member countries. SDRs are allocated 
to member countries in proportion to their IMF quotas. The SDR also serves 
as the unit of account of the IMF and some other international organisations. 
Its value is defined as a basket of key international currencies, consisting of 
the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and US dollar. The SDR interest rate 
provides the basis for calculating the interest charged to members on regular 
(nonconcessional) IMF loans, the interest paid and charged to members on their 
SDR holdings, and the interest paid to members on a portion of their quota 
subscriptions. The SDR interest rate is determined weekly and is based on a 
weighted average of representative interest rates on short-term debt in the 
money markets of the SDR basket currencies.




































































CHART 2  IMF CREDIT OUTSTANDING IN THE GENERAL 
RESOURCES ACCOUNT, 1948-2008  (1)
  (in billions of SDRs)
(1)  Data as of end April for 1948-1983, end December for 1984-2007 and 
November 15 for 2008.
Additional early repurchases further reduced the level of 
outstanding IMF resources, to below 10 billion SDR  (1) until 
end October 2008. Since then, the IMF has been grant-
ing exceptional access loans as the global financial crisis 
is unfolding. The loans provided to Hungary and Ukraine 
already raised the amount of credit outstanding to more 
than 14 billion SDR (situation as of November 15, 2008).
2.    The Fund’s current lending 
framework : issues at stake
As illustrated above, the IMF’s financial assistance instru-
ments  as  they  exist  today  are  the  result  of  the  Fund’s 
efforts to retain its relevance in an ever-changing world. In 
an attempt to adapt to changing circumstances, the Fund 
has over the years redesigned its arsenal of lending facili-
ties and fleshed out its financing policies. Nevertheless, 
lending instruments and policies were often created and 
adapted on an ad hoc basis with specific balance of pay-
ments difficulties in mind. Consequently, eligibility criteria, 
access policies and the charges and maturities schedules 
of the Fund’s lending instruments are often not mutually 
aligned.  Only  once,  in  fact,  did  the  Fund  undertake  a 
comprehensive review of its financial facilities structure as 
a whole (2000). Since then, the Board has only assessed 
specific  aspects  of  its  lending  structure  during  regular 
targeted reviews.
As a result, the IMF lacks an integrated lending frame-
work. Due to changes in members’ lending needs and to 
the creation or adjustment of policies and facilities, some 
of the Fund’s instruments may have lost their relevance, 
too. Questions have also been raised whether there might 
be gaps in the IMF’s current lending toolkit. Its current 
lending policies are also often perceived, by both users 
and  markets,  as  being  too  complex  and  fragmented. 
These issues can affect the credibility of the IMF’s lending 
framework  and,  ultimately,  the  perceived  legitimacy  of 
the institution.
2.1    Some lending facilities may have lost their 
relevance
As  early  as  the  2000  review  of  IMF  facilities,  it  was 
observed that members make much less use of the Fund’s 
more specialised facilities, which are designed to deal with 
specific contingencies and events. On that occasion, IMF 
staff already felt there was a case for the elimination of all 
the more specialised facilities. This argument was based 
on a combination of design features and changes in the 
world economy that have, or perhaps should have, made 
the instruments fall into disuse. At that time, the Board 
decided to terminate four special facilities that had gone 
virtually unused, in an effort to streamline and simplify 
the Fund’s lending structure. Today, the Fund still has one 
specialised nonconcessional facility, the CFF.
The CFF has been reviewed several times, most recently in 
2000 and 2004. Nevertheless, it has not been used since 
1999, despite the changes introduced in 2000 and some 
temporary  and  exogenous  shocks  that  have  affected 
several  members  since.  Although  IMF  staff  discussed 
the possibility of CFF access with a number of members 
concerned, these countries decided to use other options 
to  deal  with  the  shocks.  Most  of  the  middle-income 
countries concerned generally managed to weather the 
storm through a combination of non-IMF financing, use 
of reserves, and, in a few cases, greater exchange rate 
flexibility. As for the low-income members affected by the 
shocks, several of them resorted to alternative forms of 
IMF financing, including augmentations under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)  (2) and Emergency 
assistance. Others that might have qualified did not feel 
a need for an augmentation under the PRGF, while some 
countries had other financing options on more attractive 
terms than under the nonconcessional CFF.52
Against this background, the Board had considered termi-
nating the CFF at the time of its 2004 review. However, 
most Directors were willing to keep it on in its current 
form until the next review, both to give the facility extra 
time  to  prove  its  usefulness  and  in  recognition  that  it 
would take some time to develop and gauge the useful-
ness  of  the  new  financing  instruments  currently  being 
considered  for  low-income  countries.  They  suggested 
that,  in  the  absence  of  any  clear  demand  for  the  CFF 
by  the  time  of  the  next  review,  the  facility  should  be 
dropped. Nevertheless, the CFF has not been reviewed 
again since 2004.
In  2006,  the  Fund  introduced  a  new  lending  instru-
ment, the ESF, which covers exogenous shocks faced by 
low-income  countries,  including  any  event  beyond  the 
control of a member’s authorities and with a significant 
negative impact on the economy. In other words, there 
could be some overlap between the events that the ESF 
and the CFF were designed to cover. What distinguishes 
ESF financing is that it is more concessional than under 
the  CFF  and  is  similar  to  a  PRGF  arrangement.  It  also 
requires  a  comprehensive  economic  programme  to  be 
drawn up. Nevertheless, instead of creating a new lending 
instrument, the Fund could also have considered making 
the circumstances covered by the CFF less restrictive, for 
instance by redesigning it so it would have covered the 
cases currently targeted by the ESF. The apparent ineffec-
tiveness of the CFF would have justified this option.
While the CFF has not been used since 1999, the need for 
Extended Arrangements has also proved to be fairly lim-
ited over recent years. Although the EFF is still used by the 
Fund, most recently in the case of Liberia (a blend with a 
PRGF arrangement), its value added might have decreased 
as the IMF has been granting longer and successive SBAs 
to  its  members.  From  the  IMF’s  own  viewpoint,  it  can 
also  be  preferable  to  provide  renewed  financing  with 
adequate  conditionality  rather  than  upfront  medium-
term assistance. Under the existing EFF policy, the Fund 
does in fact have less assurance that it will be able to 
establish  active  cooperation  with  the  country  for  solv-
ing its medium-term problems. The EFF was furthermore 
initially designed for members facing protracted balance 
of payments problems stemming from entrenched first-
generation  structural  distortions.  Nowadays,  however, 
almost all adjustment programmes have large structural 
components. In this context, thought could be given to 
the value added of the EFF in comparison with the SBA.
2.2  Gaps perceived in the current lending structure
Questions  have  also  been  raised  as  to  whether  there 
might be gaps in the Fund’s current lending framework.
Part  of  the  criticism  relates  to  the  fact  that,  currently, 
normal access limits under the IMF’s main financing facili-
ties are purely based on a member’s actual quota. As the 
globalisation of financial flows continues, these limits for 
non-exceptional access are likely to become increasingly 
low in comparison to members’ potential needs. In this 
context, there have been calls for the normal access limits 
to be raised and for alternative criteria for determining a 
country’s financing needs and its capacity to repay to be 
explored. While recognising the potential erosion of the 
resources available for some members under the current 
limits for normal access, this issue will not be taken up 
again in this paper. 
Furthermore,  gaps  have  been  perceived  in  the  IMF’s 
exceptional access framework.
As  illustrated  in  chart  1,  the  IMF’s  exceptional  access 
policy makes an important distinction between the treat-
ment of capital account and non-capital account crises. It 
should first of all be noted that, in practice, this distinc-
tion is not always straightforward and often entails some 
degree of judgement.
Moreover, since the SRF was designed especially for mem-
bers in capital account crises with short-term exceptional 
access needs, the facility is ill-suited for members facing 
a capital account crisis with more protracted high access 
needs. Indeed, the SRF Decision explicitly recognises that 
not  all  capital  account  crises  might  be  resolved  within 
the  short  SRF  maturity.  But,  as  IMF  staff  have  repeat-
edly argued, it is very difficult to determine ex ante the 
duration of a member’s financing needs. Moreover, the 
experience  with  capital  account  crises  shows  a  greater 
variance  in  the  duration  of  countries’  balance  of  pay-
ments needs than originally expected, indicating that the 
repayment terms for the SRF may not always be adequate 
(“A” in chart 1). In a number of recent capital account 
cases involving exceptional access, the Fund has indeed 
provided high access in the credit tranches or under an 
Extended  Arrangement,  as  the  concerned  member’s 
financing need was deemed medium-term. As a result, 
while the SRF was intended to serve as the main vehicle 
for exceptional access in cases involving capital account 
pressures,  such  access  has  increasingly  been  granted 
under an SBA or EFF. review of the imf’s lending frAmework
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To illustrate this, in the first arrangements that included 
an SRF (Korea (1997), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1998)), all 
exceptional access was provided under the SRF. In subse-
quent capital account exceptional access cases, however, 
the IMF provided (at least part of the) exceptional access 
on credit tranche terms. The Fund recognised the special 
nature of these exceptional access cases, including Turkey 
(2000), Argentina (2001) and Uruguay (2002), where a 
longer period of continued IMF engagement was deemed 
consistent with the projected balance of payments needs. 
A key distinction in these cases has been high levels of 
public debt, sustained high debt-servicing requirements 
and the longer time span needed to reinforce solvency. 
Nevertheless, the way in which they were handled has 
raised questions about how to make sure that a country 
is using the best facility on hand to address a particular 
balance of payments need. The relative cost of the differ-
ent IMF facilities should provide the right incentives to this 
end. However, this is not the case at present. Although 
the duration of the SRF is shorter than that of the SBA 
or EFF, the surcharge on SRF loans is higher than the sur-
charge for high access under an SBA or EFF.
There seem to be other gaps in the Fund’s exceptional 
access framework, too. As this framework was designed 
with capital account crises in mind, the four substantive 
criteria  underpinning  the  framework  have  mainly  pro-
vided guidance and constraints where exceptional access 
was considered most appropriate, i.e. for capital account 
crises. On the other hand, the framework has provided 
less clarity in other cases, since observance of the four 
criteria is not a requirement in non-capital account crises 
and the restrictive circumstances test for the SRF precludes 
use of the facility outside capital account crises and in 
precautionary settings (“B” in chart 1). Indeed, requests 
for exceptional access outside a capital account crisis have 
occurred in cases where members had pre-existing high 
exposure to the Fund, a potential rather than an actual 
need and in “other exceptional circumstances». In fact, 
recent decisions to grant exceptional access (Brazil (2003), 
Argentina  (2003),  Turkey  (2005)  and  Uruguay  (2005)) 
involved members that were not experiencing pressures 
in their capital account. Hence, these members’ requests 
for exceptional access were only tested “in light of the 
four exceptional access criteria” and access was provided 
under the SBA. For Brazil (2003), it was acknowledged 
that there was no actual balance of payments need (as 
required under the first criterion of the exceptional access 
framework, see footnote 1 in chart 1) and that re-entry 
to capital markets was not directly applicable since Brazil 
had such access (third criterion). The country had further-
more indicated that it wanted to treat its arrangement as 
precautionary.  Argentina’s  (2003)  debt  was  considered 
not to be sustainable in the absence of a restructuring 
effort (second criterion) and prospects were not good for 
regaining access to international capital markets within 
the period that Fund resources were outstanding (third 
criterion). In the case of Turkey (2005), the debt sustain-
ability analysis underlined that the country’s debt outlook 
remained highly vulnerable to shocks (second criterion) 
and re-entry to capital markets was not directly applicable 
since Turkey had retained market access (third criterion). 
Likewise  with  Uruguay  (2005),  downside  risks  to  debt 
sustainability were considerable (second criterion) and the 
country  had  also  already  regained  market  access  (third 
criterion).
In these cases, exceptional access has been granted even 
though all four substantive criteria were not met. While 
the exceptional access framework allows for such prag-
matism, the Fund’s decisions in these cases have led to the 
perception that exceptional access decisions in non-capital 
account crises are made on an ad hoc basis. 
The newly-created SLF is an extreme case in point as it 
explicitly acknowledges that it might be justified to grant 
exceptional access to countries that do not necessarily sat-
isfy all criteria stipulated in the exceptional access frame-
work. Indeed, as explained above, the exceptional access 
framework does not apply when a purchase is requested 
under the SLF even though the latter can involve access 
up to 500 p.c. of quota.
Many  emerging  market  economies  have  perceived  yet 
another gap in the Fund’s financing framework as they are 
calling for a lending instrument that would provide insur-
ance against large and volatile capital flows. Discussions 
are  continuing  within  the  IMF  on  the  desirability  and 
possible design of a new lending facility to accommodate 
these countries’ needs (see section I). It is in this context 
that the Fund recently decided to establish the new SLF. 
Nevertheless, the SLF is only available for countries that 
are well-integrated into global capital markets and with 
strong macroeconomic positions and records of consistent 
policy implementation. Moreover, in light of the scale of 
global capital flows, several emerging market economies 
find the access limit under the SLF still too low.
Finally,  there  are  indications  that  middle-income  coun-
tries, the major IMF borrowers in the credit tranches, are 
increasingly seeking sources of official financial support 
outside the Fund. Recent examples include the BIS loans 
to Argentina in 2007 and 2008, the use of a Deferred 
Drawdown  Option  from  the  Word  Bank  by  Colombia, 
Mexico and Uruguay, recent discussions on a World Bank 
Development  Policy  Loan  for  some  EU  Member  States, 
bilateral  and  multilateral  –  other  than  from  the  IMF  – 
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financial  turmoil.  Thought  should  be  given  to  whether 
the IMF ought to have a role to play in these cases and, 
if so, why the countries concerned have not found an 
adequate financing instrument within its existing lending 
framework. 
2.3    The Fund’s financing framework seems 
fragmented and overly complex
The  IMF’s  exceptional  access  framework  is  an  example 
in case, as illustrated above. It reflects the difficulty of 
applying rather restrictive rules to accommodate a wide 
range of circumstances. Frequent “special cases” within 
the exceptional access framework have undermined the 
value of clarifying – to both members and markets – the 
conditions under which exceptional access would be pro-
vided. This has prompted criticism that the IMF’s access 
policy and its decisions in crisis situations are unclear and 
unpredictable. In other words, there seems to be room for 
improving the quality, predictability and uniformity of the 
Fund’s high access decisions.
Yet  another  example  relates  to  the  Fund’s  repurchase 
policy  and,  more  particularly,  its  policy  on  time-based 
repurchase expectations. The decisions to extend repur-
chase  expectations  are  indeed  often  presented,  and 
viewed by market participants, as a de facto reschedul-
ing of IMF credit. Confusion about what an extension of 
repurchase expectations really means leads to questions 
about  the  Fund’s  role  in  supporting  members  and  to 
misperceptions  regarding  its  policy  of  not  rescheduling 
its  claims,  possibly  eroding  its  preferred  creditor  status 
over time. In some cases, decisions on extensions could 
also be misperceived as signalling approval of a member’s 
policies. Furthermore, the mere existence of two payment 
schedules – expectations and obligations – can be confus-
ing. This confusion is compounded when a member has 
outstanding  purchases  both  in  the  credit  tranches  and 
under the SRF, since the repurchase expectations policies 
are  not  identical  for  SRF  and  other  GRA  resources,  as 
discussed earlier. Finally, implementation of the policy on 
time-based repurchase expectations has also raised ques-
tions about the appropriate benchmark against which to 
assess a member’s balance of payments when an exten-
sion of repurchase expectations is requested, particularly 
in the case of follow-up arrangements.
The recent decision to establish yet another lending facil-
ity at the IMF, namely the SLF, adds to the complexity of 
the framework. Indeed, the financial assistance envisaged 
under the SLF could be provided under a traditional SBA, 
while adding the SLF to the Fund’s lending facilities arse-
nal essentially divides countries into an A-list of nations 
that qualify for the SLF without conditionality, and a B-list 
of other countries.
2.4  In sum ...
As a general conclusion, one could say that the IMF lacks 
a  consistent  and  comprehensive  financing  framework. 
The  whole  structure  of  lending  facilities  and  policies 
needs  alignment  in  terms  of  eligibility  criteria,  access, 
pricing and maturities in order to raise the consistency, 
predictability  and  credibility  of  the  lending  framework. 
The  relatively  broad  range  of  financial  facilities,  each 
targeted at very specific balance of payments needs and 
each governed by specific rules, risks being perceived as 
too complex by members and markets alike. Furthermore, 
while some have argued that the multitude of IMF facili-
ties and policies acts as an institutional safeguard, one 
could argue that overregulation, as illustrated above, can 
lead to results that are just as arbitrary as those that may 
result from no regulation. Ill-conceived and over-detailed 
rules can prevent the IMF from doing justice in particular 
cases which the rules have not anticipated. All this could 
hamper the Fund in playing an effective signalling and 
catalytic role.
In order to address these issues, a comprehensive review of 
the IMF’s lending structure is needed and seems especially 
timely now. First of all, such a review fits squarely within 
the Fund’s ongoing Medium-Term Strategy, launched in 
2005 and aimed at redirecting the role of the IMF amid 
the challenges of the 21st century. As regards lending, 
the Medium-Term Strategy recalled the changing circum-
stances  and  challenges  of  today’s  globalised  economy, 
and its impact on IMF debtor members’ financing needs.
Reflection is warranted on whether there is a gap in the 
Fund’s  lending  structure  that  cannot  be  filled  by  using 
existing instruments. If it is concluded that there is a con-
vincing case for creating new IMF financing instruments, 
due regard should be given to their interaction with the 
Fund’s  current  financing  framework  in  order  to  avoid 
a  proliferation  of  lending  instruments  and  any  further 
inconsistencies.
Therefore, as it embarks on a review of its facilities, one of 
the issues the IMF needs to tackle is whether the present 
structure of facilities is unduly complex. Indeed, excessive 
complexity makes the Fund’s operations more difficult for 
both its own members and the public to understand. A 
new lending framework would need to strike a balance 
between simplicity on the one hand and the right incen-
tives on the other hand. In other words, it is important to 
recognise that there may be costs associated with a larger review of the imf’s lending frAmework
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number of facilities, especially in terms of complication 
and hence, a lack of transparency vis-à-vis both members 
and the public at large. At very least, therefore, when it 
considers setting up new facilities in the future, the IMF 
should first be satisfied that the problem to be addressed 
could not be dealt with equally well – or any better – 
through the existing facilities.
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that,  in  addition  to  discus-
sions on new lending instruments, the Board is currently 
also reviewing the IMF’s (exceptional) access policy and 
its overall policy on charges and maturities. In order to 
ensure consistency within the Fund’s lending framework, 
these issues would also benefit from a thorough review 
of  the  Fund’s  lending  structure.  Indeed,  a  piecemeal 
approach that misses the global picture would risk creat-
ing further discrepancies, eroding – rather than enhanc-
ing – the reputation of the IMF’s lending framework.
3.    Towards a coherent lending 
framework for the IMF
Ideally, the IMF should have an integrated lending frame-
work consisting of facilities and policies that are mutu-
ally aligned and consistently implemented. The question 
remains as to what such a framework should look like. 
Conceptually, there are three broad options, which are 
further  elaborated  below.  Note  that  each  of  the  sug-
gested options is designed so as to prevent unduly large 
and prolonged use of the Fund’s resources. This should 
ensure that the monetary character of IMF financing and 
the revolving nature of its resources are preserved.
A schematic overview of each of the proposed options 
can be found in the table below.
3.1    A multi-facility framework with one facility for 
each type of balance of payments need
One option would be to respond to each type of financ-
ing  need  with  a  different  IMF  financial  facility.  This 
means that there would be a different facility for normal 
short-term access, normal longer-term access, high short-
term access and high longer-term access to the Fund’s 
resources, for both members’ actual and potential bal-
ance  of  payments  needs.  In  fact,  the  Fund’s  current 
lending  structure  is  built  largely  around  this  idea.  The 
current facilities structure consists of a set of instruments 
whereby each facility is aimed at a different type of bal-
ance of payments need : the SBA for normal short- to 
medium-term access ; the SRF for high short-term access 
(be it only for capital-account-driven crises) ; the EFF for 
normal medium- to long-term access cases ; and precau-
tionary Stand-By and Extended Arrangements for coun-
tries with no immediate balance of payments needs but 
some financial imbalances and risks to their balance of 
payments. The lack of explicit policies for longer-term and 
precautionary exceptional access reflects IMF members’ 
divergent views on the desirability of granting exceptional 
access in these cases.56
It is clear that, within this model, a specialised nonconces-
sional facility, designed to deal with specific contingencies 
or events, adds little value to the system. In this context, 
there might be a case for removing the CFF, the SLF  (1) and 
the restriction on the use of the SRF for capital account 
crises only.
In light of the concerns raised in the previous section of 
this paper, there is also scope for aligning and refining 
the  terms  and  conditions  governing  IMF  lending.  The 
fragmented nature of the current lending policies could 
actually create room for “arbitrage across facilities” and 
for concerns regarding the IMF’s credibility. Indeed, as the 
Fund’s lending policies often provide room for flexibility 
to accommodate individual members’ needs, some of its 
lending decisions have been perceived as arbitrary. This 
perception may harm the predictability and credibility of 
the Fund’s lending decisions and ultimately the perceived 
legitimacy of the institution.
Part of the problems with the Fund’s current financing 
structure  relate  to  its  exceptional  access  framework, 
as  explained  in  the  previous  section.  Indeed,  the  rules 
underpinning this framework provide less guidance and 
clarity in non-capital account crises than in capital account 
cases. Moreover, while short-term high access is provided 
under an SRF, which was specifically designed for such 
cases, medium-term exceptional access is provided under 
an  “ordinary”  Stand-By  or  Extended  Arrangement.  As 
indicated above, views nevertheless diverge on the need 
for an explicit policy on exceptional access in these cases 
for which the exceptional access framework and the SRF 
were not designed particularly.
Two  options  could  be  envisaged  in  dealing  with  these 
issues. The first would entail only minimum changes to 
the existing lending structure, while keeping the current 
distinction between capital and non-capital account crises 
in exceptional access decisions. As is currently the case, 
the four substantive criteria under the exceptional access 
framework would need to be met in the event of capital 
account crises, while for non-capital account cases, the 
criteria would only provide guidance, leaving the Board 
flexibility to grant exceptional access under the exceptional 
circumstances clause. In the same vein, the presumption 
that  the  SRF  should  be  used  for  exceptional  access  in 
capital account crises, when conditions for its use apply, 
would also be preserved. Nevertheless, in order to remove 
the cost incentive for financing in the credit tranches or 
under the EFF above the access limits when the use of 
shorter-maturity SRF resources would be more appropri-
ate, the surcharges between these two sets of facilities 
need to be aligned. This could imply the introduction of 
a time-based surcharge under the SBA and the EFF for 
credit above the access limits, in line with the modalities 
of SRF financing. The resultant overall surcharge structure 
would ensure that a member pays more for exceptional 
access to the Fund’s resources and the longer these are 
used, under whatever facility they are granted.
Under a second option, one could consider more com-
prehensive changes to the Fund’s lending framework. A 
case could be made for abolishing the exceptional access 
framework.  First,  while  the  exceptional  access  frame-
work was developed with capital account crises in mind, 
experience has demonstrated that members have equally 
needed exceptional access in non-capital account crises. 
Within  this  context,  it  might  be  reasonable  to  abolish 
the current distinction between capital and non-capital 
account  cases.  Second,  in  non-capital  account  cases, 
exceptional access has been provided where (several of) 
the four substantive criteria underpinning the exceptional 
access framework had not been explicitly met, illustrating 
the difficulty of applying rather restrictive rules to accom-
modate  a  wide  range  of  circumstances.  Instead  of  the 
current four specific exceptional access criteria, one could 
envisage  the  Fund  granting  exceptional  access  on  the 
basis of the three criteria guiding all access to GRA financ-
ing. These criteria include (i) an actual or potential balance 
of payments need ; (ii) the capacity to repay the Fund, 
including the strengths of the adjustment programme and 
(iii) a member’s outstanding use of IMF credit and record 
in the use of Fund resources.
One could argue, however, that applying “less restrictive 
criteria” could increase the number of cases potentially 
eligible for exceptional access, thus raising the risks the 
IMF  faces  in  terms  of  potential  credit  concentration  to 
large borrowers. To address this issue, under such a set-
ting, the terms of the SRF should be used more broadly, 
i.e. in all cases involving exceptional access. The relatively 
high surcharges applied under the SRF, increasing with the 
time that IMF credit remains outstanding, should ensure 
that the Fund is not exposed to high levels of credit risk 
for an unduly long time. In order to accommodate more 
protracted high-access requirements, the maturity of the 
SRF might need to be adjusted accordingly. Again, the 
surcharges increasing with the length of time IMF credit 
remains outstanding should ensure that, in these cases 
too, unduly long use of the Fund’s resources is prevented. 
Note also that, if the SRF is used in all cases involving 
exceptional  access  to  the  Fund’s  resources,  precaution-
ary  high  access  under  the  SRF  would  also  need  to  be 
formalised.
(1)  The SLF Decision already incorporates a sunset clause, providing for the expiration 
of the facility two years after its establishment. At that time the Board can review 
experience with the facility and determine whether it should continue to exist 
and whether any design changes are warranted.review of the imf’s lending frAmework
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Finally, apart from the issues related to the IMF’s excep-
tional access framework, problems regarding its current 
lending structure have also been observed within the con-
text of its repurchase policy, as explained in section II. In 
order to address these issues, the practice concerning the 
Fund’s decisions to extend time-based repurchase expecta-
tions and the associated publication requirements should 
be clarified and harmonised across facilities. Nevertheless, 
a case could also be made for simply abolishing the policy 
on time-based repurchase expectations. Indeed, Article V, 
Section 7(b) of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement already 
states that a country must repurchase when its balance 
of payments need disappears. The effective implementa-
tion  of  this  Article  renders  other  repurchase  incentives 
unnecessary. However, under such an approach, a system 
would  need  to  be  in  place  to  encourage  members  to 
make  voluntary  advance  repurchases.  This  could  be 
achieved through adequate reporting to the Board or the 
publication of information regarding borrowing members’ 
external  positions  in  relation  to  their  outstanding  IMF 
loans.  Alternatively  (or  additionally),  a  system  could  be 
considered involving a Board review of a country’s balance 
of payments and reserve position, at regular intervals after 
the last drawing, in order to determine whether or not it 
should be expected to make an early repayment, and if 
so, at what pace.
3.2  A single flexible facility
At the other extreme, the Fund could opt for a single 
SBA-type facility that would be applied flexibly. This kind 
of system is appealing for its simplicity, transparency and 
because it avoids the difficulty of analysing ex ante the 
type and expected duration of the balance of payments 
need in question. In order to be workable and to ensure 
equal treatment, this approach would have to be based 
on clear rules. Such a system would nevertheless depend 
to  a  large  extent  on  the  Board’s  ability  to  take  well-
thought-out decisions based on clear principles governing 
the IMF’s financial role and rigorous justification of every 
individual decision, with due regard to precedents and the 
merits and requirements of each case.
For a single facility (with a single maturity structure) to be 
able to address the issue of longer-than-expected financ-
ing needs, one could allow for consecutive arrangements. 
This would be a recognition of the fact that it is difficult 
to predict the duration of a member’s balance of pay-
ments need in advance. Furthermore, it would increase 
countries’ ownership of the adjustment programme and 
give  the  Fund  more  leverage  in  promoting  members’ 
adjustment efforts.
Second, a surcharge system, be it time- or level-based, or 
a combination of both, would need to be contemplated 
to prevent unduly long and large use of IMF resources. 
From a theoretical point of view, it could be argued that 
the  rate  of  charge  should  not  be  used  to  discourage 
large use of Fund resources. The extent of IMF assistance 
should be based on the needs of a country : only large 
needs justify large use. It is the responsibility of the staff 
and the Board to verify if the amounts requested are in 
line with actual needs. This view pleads against the use 
of level-based surcharges and in favour of the sole use 
of time-based surcharges. This would add greatly to the 
transparency and simplicity of the surcharge structure. It 
would of course constitute a breach with current practice 
and might be conceived as too simplistic to capture the 
whole range of incentives and disincentives targeted by 
the current system.
The intuitively most appealing option, therefore, would be 
a combination of the two approaches. This kind of system 
would  entail  a  matrix  of  charges  associated  with  time 
and amount of resources outstanding. Though richest in 
its incentive structure, such a combined system may also 
be deemed too complex and not sufficiently transparent. 
Alternatively, a surcharge system combining the charac-
teristics  of  the  different  graduation  schedules  that  are 
currently in place, could be envisaged. Indeed, for credit 
outstanding  above  the  cumulative  limit  of  300 p.c.  of 
quota, there is a case for a surcharge system in line with 
that under the SRF. This implies the introduction of a time-
based surcharge structure, providing incentives in support 
of the temporary use of exceptional access. Moreover, this 
time-based graduation would need to be applied across 
successive arrangements in one way or another. For credit 
outstanding below 300 p.c. of quota, a surcharge increas-
ing with the level of IMF credit outstanding, aiming mainly 
at discouraging excessive use, might be preferred. Such a 
graduated surcharge starting at a relatively low level of 
credit would, moreover, allow for a gradual increase in the 
surcharge and thus reduce the discontinuities arising from 
one large step at 300 p.c. of quota.
3.3  A dual framework, consisting of two facilities
One could also opt for a dual-facility framework between 
the two more extreme options described above.
Such a framework could, for example, have a facility for 
short-term access (an “SBA-type” facility) and a facility 
for medium- to long-term access to the Fund’s resources   
(an “EFF-type” facility), both also useable on a precau-
tionary basis and for exceptional access to IMF finance. 
Such an approach could be justified on the basis of the 58
observation  that  there  appears  to  be  a  tendency  for 
countries’ balance of payments needs to be either very 
short or rather long. Under such a framework, surcharges 
under the facility for medium- to long-term access would, 
for any level of credit outstanding, be higher than under 
the facility for short-term access. This should discourage 
unduly long use of the Fund’s resources. To discourage 
unduly  large  use  of  IMF  finance,  the  surcharge  under 
both  facilities  would  rise  with  the  level  of  Fund  credit 
outstanding.
Alternatively, the Fund could also opt for a framework 
consisting of a facility for normal access (an “SBA-type” 
facility) and a facility for exceptional access (an “SRF-type” 
facility), both of which could also be used on a precautio-
nary basis. This approach could be justified on the basis 
of recent evidence that members’ needs for IMF resources 
is expected to remain concentrated at the two ends of 
the access spectrum. It is indeed likely that GRA users’ 
needs will either be primarily for signalling purposes (with 
low access) or for large access associated with a sudden 
deterioration in capital market conditions (where the need 
may be for exceptional access). Under this kind of frame-
work, surcharges under the facility for exceptional access 
would be higher than under the facility for normal access, 
irrespective  of  the  duration  of  outstanding  IMF  loans. 
This should discourage excessive use of IMF finance. To 
discourage unduly long use of the Fund’s resources, the 
surcharge under both facilities would rise with the time of 
Fund credit outstanding.
Conclusion
In an effort to adapt to changes in its environment, the 
IMF has over the years adjusted its lending framework. 
Lending  facilities  and  policies  have  been  created,  abol-
ished or modified, according to changing global circum-
stances. Nevertheless, these adaptations have often been 
made on an ad hoc basis.
This has given rise to some inconsistencies between the 
Fund’s lending facilities. Some of its lending instruments 
even seem to have lost their relevance. The Fund’s more 
specialised facilities in particular have either not (yet) been 
used or have been used much less than expected. The use 
of  the  EFF  has  declined  as  the  Fund  has  been  granting 
longer and successive SBAs. Other concerns are related to 
perceived gaps in the current lending structure. The SRF, for 
example, which was designed for members facing capital 
account crises with short-term exceptional access needs, 
is  ill-suited  for  members  facing  a  capital  account  crisis 
with more protracted high access needs. Also, the IMF’s 
exceptional access framework was designed for members 
facing a capital account crisis and has therefore provided 
less guidance in non-capital account cases. Moreover, some 
emerging markets have called for a lending instrument that 
would provide insurance against large and volatile capital 
flows, while middle-income countries are increasingly seek-
ing  sources  of  official  financial  support  outside  the  IMF. 
Finally, the Fund’s lending framework is often perceived as 
being too complex and fragmented (e.g. the exceptional 
access framework and the repurchase policy).
In order to address these issues, a comprehensive review 
of the IMF lending framework is direly needed. In fact, 
the  Fund  is  currently  reviewing  its  lending  instruments 
and access policies in the context of its ongoing overall 
strategic  review.  This  paper  seeks  to  provide  an  input 
into this process and, within this context, suggests three 
options  for  modernising  the  Fund’s  lending  structure. 
Under  the  first  option,  the  spirit  of  the  current  multi-
facility framework would be maintained, with a different 
facility for each type of financing need. In order to make 
this new multi-facility framework less complex and more 
internally consistent than the current set-up, a number of 
modifications are put forward to the policies governing it. 
More specifically, in order to better align the Fund’s lend-
ing facilities and policies, the current exceptional access 
and repurchase policies would need to be adjusted at the 
very least.
A second option involves the most far-reaching adjust-
ment of the Fund’s lending framework, as it would replace 
the whole arsenal of IMF facilities with a single, flexible, 
SBA-type facility. Such a system is appealing for its sim-
plicity, transparency and because it avoids the problem of 
having to analyse ex ante the type and expected duration 
of a member’s balance of payments needs. On the other 
hand, in order to be workable and to ensure uniformity of 
treatment, each lending decision would need to be based 
on clear rules and with due regard to precedents and the 
merits and requirements of each case.
As  an  intermediary  solution,  the  third  option  suggests 
replacing  the  current  lending  framework  with  a  dual 
framework. Such a structure would comprise two facili-
ties ; one facility for short- and one for medium- to long-
term access or, alternatively, one facility for normal access 
and one for exceptional access to IMF resources.review of the imf’s lending frAmework
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